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**META-LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS**

STRATEGIES TO BUILD GOVERNMENT CONNECTIVITY

Leonard J. Marcus

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Barry C. Dorn

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Joseph M. Henderson

U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION

THE PROBLEM

The acute threat of internationally driven and homeland-directed terrorism has changed the rules and expectations for governmental action, interaction, and willpower. Unprecedented coordination of resources, information, and expertise is required in the face of new hazards emanating from an elusive and a yet active and well-organized network of hostile terrorist cells (Danzig, 2003). While the period since 9/11 has witnessed a spate of governmental reorganization and restructuring—the most visible in the speedy formation of the Department of Homeland Security and the 9/11 Commission recommended revamping of intelligence agencies¹ (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004)—the hoped for change in behavior and impact has lagged far behind shifts in organizational form and mandate² (Mintz, 2005). This reluctance to change is alarming given the enormity of the immediate terrorist danger and the consequences of less-than-optimal prevention, emergency preparedness, and response. How can this resistance to change be understood, and what can be done strategically to accelerate realization of full national preparedness potential?

The vast literature and experience on the difficulties of accomplishing any sort of quick organizational change need not be recounted here (Kotter, 1996). Suffice it to say that the silo effect of distinct cultures, budgets, and narrowly focused career ascendancy compels government agencies toward self-protectiveness, insularity, and allegiance to their own agency-based advocacy and independence. There are also deeply ingrained traditions of rivalry and palpable struggles for control, especially among organizations with similar or overlapping missions and scope of responsibility (Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987). These rivalries when imposed upon preparedness for and the response to an unprecedented terrorist attack can compound what is already disastrous, as was seen in New York on 9/11 between the fire and police departments, two interdependent agencies with a history of antagonism³ (Dwyer, 2002). Once first responders arrived on the scene, radios could not communicate, separate command centers were established, and information was not shared. In the heat of the moment, that lack of coordination translated into higher mortality and morbidity figures for firefighters at the World Trade Center. Closely observing the flaming buildings from an NYPD helicopter, police officers foresaw the collapse of the towers and radioed police to evacuate. The message, because connections had not previously been established, never reached firefighters who continued to stream into the flaming structure⁴ (New York City Fire Department, 2002).

Since the initial shock of 9/11, there certainly has been important progress in improving cooperation. This has been accomplished on two essential dimensions: “people-to-people” and “on paper.” “People-to-people” refers to the many conferences, drills, and working groups that have very importantly introduced and engaged responsible officials from different agencies and levels of government who will have to work together in responding to a disaster. This familiarity goes a long way in building lines of communication and understanding across cooperating agencies. “On paper” refers to new policies, procedures, and protocols that have been established to regulate and balance response activities. For example, the February 2003 adoption of *Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-5)* establishes “a single, comprehensive national incident management system” (White House, 2003). HSPD-5 led to adoption of the National Response Plan (NRP), built on the template of the National Incident Management System⁵ (NIMS) (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2005). Its adoption signifies a fundamental step in developing a universal frame of reference and shared language for preparing for, responding to, and recovering from terrorist attacks and other emergencies. As the NRP moves from paper to actual testing, implementation, and refinement, it will provide a valuable index to assess and improve system response.

Despite all this progress, the overall national goal and strategy must be to achieve a tactically effective and firmly institutionalized operational state of terrorism preparedness. And on that score, the country has not defined precisely what that means, and therefore, at what point it would be achieved. What is the evidence? While the “people-to-people” and “on paper” effort has enhanced the capacities and capabilities of responding agencies, nothing is more telling than the “in practice” response to what officials believe could be an actual event: suspected anthrax in a post office, sarin or other nerve agents setting off detectors in a subway station, a threatened dirty bomb, or the discovery of hazardous material in a city. It has been found that in those situations, different agencies often move into overlapping command stances, lines of communication turn out to be significantly less than optimal, and responding agencies utilize different metrics to calculate and determine just what is happening and what should be done. “In practice,” we still have a long way to go before these matters are clarified and optimally operational.

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There remains a troublesome possibility that during a mass casualty incident in practice—emergency responders once again will clash, the public will be given conflicting information, and lives will be unnecessarily lost simply because agency leaders now, in the pre-event preparatory period, did not come to terms with the critical need to achieve a versatile capacity for connectivity: that bigger and coherent picture of distinct, consistent, and overlapping roles and responsibilities necessary to counter and diffuse terrorist challenges⁶ (Inglesby, Senate testimony, April 18, 2002). On matters of leadership decision making and agency interaction, precise plans and refined models have yet to be uniformly established, tested, and deeply-ingrained.

The country does not at present have the luxury to patiently wait while agencies take their time to adjust operating procedures and protocols: progress in achieving a protected homeland needs to be quicker and deeper than what would occur in the normal course of governmental change and response⁷ (Inglesby, Grossman & O’Toole, 2001). Documents and declarations alone will not foment the necessary change. There is after all a significant danger facing the country, and the slow pace of terrorism preparedness itself increases national vulnerability. What will it take to accelerate the pace?

AN EXPANDED NOMENCLATURE FOR LEADERSHIP: “META-LEADERSHIP”

The answer is leadership. Organizational change occurs slowly and it offers solutions to problems in the long run, as a gradual, evolutionary process. Individual people—leaders—however, can and should be more agile and adaptive in the short run, and are able to prompt the sort of resilient and flexible organizational response required for quick and immediate change⁸ (Gardner, 1990). The problem, of course, is that well-intended leaders, practicing what they believe is effective leadership⁹, could be just as much part of the problem as they are part of the solution. Leadership could work—and it has—to fortify the silo mentality of agencies, this despite the fact that it is the coordinated action of many agencies working together that is essential to advancing the national preparedness effort. If leadership, as traditionally understood, is working to build the capacity within organizations, then what different brand of leadership is necessary to get beyond that silo thinking to achieve the cross-agency coordination of effort required for terrorism preparedness?

The answer to that question could very well lie in what is introduced in this paper as “meta-leadership.” The prefix “meta” as used here refers to overarching leadership that connects the purposes and the work of different organizations or organizational units. Just as “meta-research” refers to identification of broader themes and conclusions that emerge from a body of related investigation, and “meta-analysis” refers to a frame of reference that joins diverse thinking into a coherent framework, “meta-leadership” refers to guidance, direction, and momentum across organizational lines that develops into a shared course of action and a commonality of purpose among people and agencies that are doing what appears to be very different work⁶

Achieving quick and effective national preparedness requires an array of government and non-government organizations to coordinate their planning, collaboration, and response to anticipated terrorist acts (Carter, 2003). Leaders who are able to influence and accomplish such collaboration of effort across organizations—multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency, and public-private—are termed “meta-leaders.” These leaders connect with, influence, and integrate the activities of diverse agencies, thereby motivating interaction, enhancing communication, and engendering the sort of cross-organizational confidence necessary for effective terrorism preparedness and emergency response⁷ (Howitt & Piangi, 2003). They are able to legitimately and effectively reach beyond their scope of authority and responsibility, and in the process, are able to generate linkages of purpose and activity that amplify their outcomes and impact⁸ (Heifetz, 1994). They leverage information and resources across agencies, extending what any unit alone could accomplish, by reducing inter-agency friction and creating a synergy of progress (Phillips & Loy, 2003). These meta-leaders achieve “connectivity,” defined here as a seamless web of people, organization, resources, and information that can best catch (detect and report), respond (control and contain), and return to pre-event normal (recover) from a terrorist incident. Connectivity—among agencies, organizations, and people with complementary missions—is one by-product of meta-leadership.

Meta-leaders require a distinct mindset, a unique set of skills, and a network to encourage cross-agency thinking, risk taking, and productivity⁹ (Ashkenas, et al., 2002). Meta-leadership requires those who practice it to go beyond their job descriptions, since achieving unprecedented and ground-breaking cross-organizational collaboration is itself beyond the experience, mission, and task of any single organization or agency alone. One example of this need for meta-leadership and coordination is deployment and dispensing of medications by the Strategic National Stockpile as well as equipment during an emergency. Such a move requires collaborative planning among multiple federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; cooperation between federal officials and private contracting organizations; and receipt, delivery, and pharmaceutical administration by state and local officials working with private health care providers¹⁰ (Department of Homeland Security [DHS] website, Jan. 25, 2005). The goal in such an operation is rapid treatment of ill people and protection of people who have been exposed, assuring that the right people get the right medications at the best possible time and place. To accomplish a specific mission—from the decision to administer vaccine to the actual mass injection of vaccine in the population—the operation must be seamless. Each person involved must know his or her roles and responsibilities. Organizational logistics must be in place and ready to go. The necessary resources must be appropriate to the emergency. And there must be a constant and reliable flow of information to continuously assess and adjust decision making and action in response to changing contingencies—the essence of connectivity¹¹. Since such an operation has never been accomplished in rapid action in this country, this cross-agency and multi-jurisdictional work will require meta-leaders to effectively prepare before the event and similarly, it will require meta-leaders during an actual deployment to guide and manage the operation under significant stress and pressure.

ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND SYSTEM META-LEADERSHIP: COMMONALITIES AND DISTINCTIONS

What is the difference between organizational leadership and system meta-leadership (Bennis & Nanus, 1985)?

Leaders derive their power and influence first from their formal job descriptions and authority. For example, an organizational leader who has budget authority is able to significantly influence the behavior and compliance of his or her direct reports. Power and influence is to some extent embedded into the structure and operation of the organization (Northouse, 2004).

Meta-leaders work in a far less scripted fashion. They seek to influence what happens in other organizations, though this effect is in large measure a matter of effective negotiation and the development of personal and organizational credibility that stretches across organizational lines. It is easiest to establish cross-organizational influence when bringing something of value to the table, as would generally occur in a formal negotiation. In essence, one can begin the process of achieving connectivity by purchasing it—through a business deal or memorandum of understanding—as part of a contractual deal between entities.

It is far more difficult when the meta-leader is advocating adherence to a set of common goals and purposes for which there may be little or no direct compensation. And it is even more difficult when those shared purposes require sacrifice, the reduction of autonomy and independence, or a change in culture or operating procedures¹⁶ (Schein, 2004, p.11). Such is sometimes the case for those who seek to advance cross-agency or multi-jurisdictional coordinated governmental action to achieve national preparedness. Finally, it is most difficult when efforts to accomplish connectivity involve creating new relationships among traditionally competitive agencies. Deeply embedded antagonisms and powerful proclivities to contest control and authority complicate any effort to enhance collaboration. The meta-leader risks not only failure of the effort. Beyond that there is the professional peril that one's colleagues can grow skeptical of this consorting with the "enemy," while the enemy delights in the failure of efforts to create a shared enterprise. The pursuit of meta-leadership under such circumstances can be professionally dangerous and even painful (Heifetz & Linsky, 2002).

Another distinction between traditional leadership and meta-leadership as it pertains to national preparedness is that the former is focused on a known and time-honored tradition of organizational direction and accomplishment. For example, the Department of Defense has for generations focused its attention largely upon defending the country against threats emanating from identifiable foreign powers. Threatening missiles in the Soviet Union, for example, could be observed, strategies to counter them could be developed, and training could be focused on how to neutralize this significant danger. The current terrorist challenge facing the country is not characterized by that same sort of tangible enemy, mission, or purpose. What benefit will a new submarine accomplish—able in rapid sequence to launch 20 nuclear-tipped missiles—against clandestine terrorist cells without significant points of vulnerability or targets? The present-day enemy is elusive, the weapons are unfamiliar, and the potential targets are innumerable and often well hidden. While leaders traditionally have been responsible for steering the course of their organization, meta-leaders must chart a new course in coordination with a range of other agencies generally outside the purview of prior organizational experience or responsibility. The military has taken important steps to create new operational units, such as the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), though it still has a long way to go in coordinating its operations and assets with civilian authorities who will operationalize activity in local districts, it is hoped with helpful access to military resources that may be in the area¹⁷ (Tussing & Kievit, 2003, 1).

Organizations like cultures provide a source of familiarity, support, and even comfort for those accustomed to working within. There is the brotherhood of the fire fighters, the solace of the doctor’s lounge, and the back-slapping encouragement customary for politicians. More than may be generally acknowledged, people live in the familiar zone of their chosen profession or career. Leadership, credibility, and experience grow within the time-honored and conventional confines of that work. It can then be uncomfortable to engage outside of that known sphere of influence. Meta-leaders are able to accomplish the task, feeling and acting at ease even when engaging with people outside their professional domain or expertise, able to act comfortably in someone else’s space and making others feel welcomed and accepted in theirs. Metaphorically, it could be said that meta-leaders are able to speak multiple languages, fluent in their own and able to talk the talk of others¹⁸ (Kritek, 1996). They absorb concepts, facts, and vocabulary particular to other fields of work. By way of tangible illustration, it is not uncommon for government agencies to describe their different offices and functions using their homegrown version of bureaucratic alphabet soup. Meta-leaders are careful not to foster a barrier between insiders who understand and outsiders not familiar with the “lingo.”

“Meta-leaders are those who encourage people and organizations to extend beyond their traditional scope of interest and activity.”

The most important distinction between leaders and meta-leaders is their relative breadth of focus and intercession. “Leaders” as used and distinguished here refers to those working within organizations that authorize and condone their leadership. That leadership is buttressed by the many cohesive and defined rudiments of organizational structure: the organizational chart, policies, procedures, rules, lines of authority, measurable outcomes, standards, behavioral expectations, and sanctions for violations of the above. These artifacts provide the framework through which the leader leads (Heifetz, 1994).

By contrast, meta-leaders operate without many of these supports, linking organizations and people often without the benefit of precedent, consensus on what should be done, or exactly how the task should be accomplished. The ambition as well as the art of meta-leadership thrives in the creation of something new and something that is mission driven¹⁹ (Bennis, 2003, 133). As it pertains to matters of national preparedness, leaders often very capably harness organizations to pursue their traditional mission and allegiances. By contrast, where there has been a synergy of effort and true innovation across agencies, meta-leaders are those who encourage people and organizations to extend beyond their traditional scope of interest and activity. These meta-leaders have reached beyond provincial thinking to drive terrorism preparedness as a systems endeavor, fashioning innovative, complex, adaptive, and flexible governmental capabilities essential now in responding to the terrorist threat (Pandita & Lammers, 1997). In so doing, the meta-leader is able to achieve an outcome that is far bigger than the sum of its parts.

The practice of meta-leadership and accomplishment of its objectives—as laudable as they may be—are complicated by the fact that its execution is outside traditional lines of organizational advancement, that it does not always provide reward for its achievement, and that it has an uncomfortably public quality to it. What does it take in practice to be an accomplished meta-leader?

THE ART AND PRACTICE META-LEADERSHIP: UNIQUE SKILLS, CAPACITIES AND PERSPECTIVES

For the meta-leader, “out-of-the-box” is a frame of reference and way of thinking. The box and all that goes with it—sanction, authority, the known, and the comfortable—are of relatively less importance than the

combined potential achievable by the system if it were to operate as an intentionally interwoven network of connected parts (Zaleznik, 2004). The meta-leader perceives that potential. He or she endeavors to give that image meaning, purpose, and a means of achievement.

The art of meta-leadership derives from the capacity to envision a sum that is larger than its parts and then to find a way to communicate, inspire, and persuade broader participation (Nanus, 1992). It is a creative endeavor. The meta-leader must often give life to a vision or objective that does not already exist. Exceptional talent is required to describe that bigger picture and then imbue it with meaning. It is a difficult task. For followers, the vision is as real as the meta-leader, who, in their minds, embodies the goals and objectives of the combined endeavor (Gardner, 1990). In this way, through his or her behavior and actions, the meta-leader is able to motivate people to follow along. Abstract goals and objectives of homeland security, for example, preparations for a special national security event such as a highly visible sporting competition or political gathering²⁰ (DHS Website, January 25, 2005), assume tangible meaning, and with that, the meta-leader is able to mold actions toward the most important outcomes and impact.

To accomplish this feat, the meta-leader appreciates the distinct values, goals, motives, and missions of the different organizational entities that are recruited to coordinated action. He or she grasps how those differences could actually complement one another, even as they are generally seen as the rationale for waging battles for control. How is this accomplished?

The meta-leader connects disparate groups by aligning core interests and motivations, redefining success not as a silo-driven objective but rather as a product of the combined action and interaction of the multiple silos working in a coordinated synchronization. In other words, each of the parts recognizes that its individual success is derived in part from the success of the whole endeavor (Marcus, et al., 1995). By aligning goals and objectives, the meta-leader is able to encourage movement toward achievement of those newly discovered and overlapping motivations, and with that, creates a synergy of effort, a reduction of competition and waste, and a new efficiency of coordination and cooperation²¹ (Goleman, 1998). A homeland security official in Bakersfield, California illustrated this phenomenon. She was responsible for allocating funds and new equipment to county fire and police departments. When the federal monies arrived to finance the purchases, the amount turned out to be far less than expected. Because of the new tone of cooperation that had already been achieved by these previously competitive agencies, they were able together to develop an evenhanded plan for allocating the reduced funds. Each department received less in the way of personal protective equipment than anticipated, and at the same time, they together developed a plan to better coordinate use of the gear in the event it would have to be deployed.²² A meta-leader not only comprehends the bigger picture: by virtue of setting the stage for effective understanding and communication, the meta-leader is able to persuade others as well to see and be motivated by that enlarged vision for what needs to be done and how it can be achieved.

In order to accomplish the task, with so much to perceive and so much to integrate, the meta-leader engages multi-dimensional problem solving. This mind-set requires looking at a problem and its considerations from all angles. It has the meta-leader seeking pertinent questions and then surveying a wide breadth of information relevant to the mission at hand, often then reaching well beyond his or her range of expertise and direct experience. Who are the key stakeholders? And since each of these stakeholders likely defines the presenting problem very differently, what are each of their unique interests and perspectives on the relevant challenge or question? Given the many views on what needs to be done, what is it that must be accomplished, both for each of the individual constituents as well as for solving the bigger problem? How does this newly forming conceptualization break down into a reasonable set of priorities?

What obstacles or frictions must be accounted for? And how can success be defined and redefined in terms that are reasonable, achievable, and acceptable to the array of concerned stakeholders?

The meta-leader is a quick read, accurate and efficient in collecting, analyzing, and packaging data into strategic themes of action and interaction. This assembled multi-dimensional assessment is readily synthesized and packaged into a form and format that has wide applicability and meaning for those who are the intended audiences. On matters of homeland security, these audiences include responsible federal, state, and local government agencies, Congress, the media, and ultimately, the public. Most importantly, the meta-leader is able to get people on board by helping them make sense of widely cast and disparate information, putting it into a coherent message that serves to unite the people whom the meta-leader must recruit as followers. In this way, it is both the persona and the perspective of the meta-leader that engages people in the message and direction of the leadership agenda.

Assembling a new terrorism response network is an enormous challenge. What are the personal and interpersonal qualities needed to accomplish the task?

THE PERSON OF THE META-LEADER: UNIQUE SENSIBILITIES AND PERSPECTIVES

This paper does not intend to recount the literature on the many personal qualities required for leadership and meta-leadership, nor does it delve deeply into the debate about whether one is born or can be trained for the task (Bennis, 2004; Northouse, 2004). Rather, this section highlights particular personal traits, common for all who aspire to leadership, which must be in greater abundance for those who practice meta-leadership (Coutu, 2004; Kouzes & Posner, 1987).

What is required to be a meta-leader? Who are those leaders who recognize the importance of achieving the complex goals of terrorism preparedness and who then have the will and the means to achieve them? What are their meta-leadership traits and unique skills and capabilities?

1. Courage

Preparedness leaders must be able to mobilize the nation, a state, or a local area against an unknowable threat, with unprecedented consequences, while spending and diverting immense resources, time, and energy, all for a catastrophe that may never happen in their jurisdiction or that may never happen at all. While this is relatively easier in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist incident, achieving and maintaining appropriate vigilance for the long haul is a far more daunting task. Meta-leaders must be willing to confront the resistance to the undertaking, including opposition to organizational change, the adherence to rules and convention that may obstruct preparedness, the management of unintended consequences, and a general wariness that the effort and investment are appropriately calibrated to the threat. Despite that resistance—which can take the form of professional bad-mouthing, organizational stone walling, and even personal attack—the meta-leader persists in forging the system-wide mission, focus and connectivity necessary to build a network of readiness. And of course, this courage could very likely be called upon in the midst of directing the response to an actual event, as was seen repeatedly by key on-the-scene leadership in the moments following the events of 9/11 (Giuliani, 2002).

On matters of terrorism preparedness and meta-leadership, courage in practice requires the judgment to accurately calculate risk, take risks as appropriate, and face the consequences on the other side. At times this means extending the rules, breaking them, and moving beyond tradition in order to make progress

on matters of importance. Smart and strategic courage ultimately can breed respect, if the risks taken achieve productive outcomes. The meta-leader recognizes that such respect can be fleeting and therefore must be continuously earned and proven. The flip side of this courage—and certainly an important point of caution—is that courage can also manifest as stubbornness, recklessness, foolhardiness, and carelessness, all of which could easily surface when facing an abstract and overwhelming threat, and all of which would serve to compromise the impact and credibility of the would be meta-leader.

2. Curiosity

There is much unknown about weapon of mass destruction terrorism, what it will take to marshal the cross-organizational connectivity to mount an effective response, and the steps necessary to achieve the appropriate level of preparedness. The meta-leader approaches the challenge with a calculated measure of humility and curiosity. Topics about which he or she is not expert are acknowledged, and ignorance is balanced by an abundant and genuine eagerness to learn and to know. Working across organizational boundaries, he or she is willing to venture into substantive matters of science, procedure, or policy in which proficiency and comfort are lacking. Meta-leaders ask good questions. They are keen listeners and they are able to integrate and apply new information using their clear analytic capabilities. They know what they need to learn, they find ways to learn it, and they know how to make best use of new knowledge, insight, and understanding (Senge, 1994).

3. Imagination

Courage and curiosity combined allow the meta-leader to envision what cannot otherwise be seen: disaster on an unprecedented scale; cross-organizational collaboration as never before experienced; and a new appreciation for a world in which international terrorism has become fixed into the human landscape. Using his or her imagination, the meta-leader is able metaphorically to go to the mountain, see the grand picture, and envision and integrate bits and pieces of intelligence and information into a coherent, grounded plan with a clear line projecting strategy, operations, tactics, and logistics. It is a matter of being able to perceive something that otherwise cannot be tangibly observed and being able to motivate and energize others to be part of the endeavor. The smallpox threat offers a compelling illustration.

Since its eradication in the 1970s, smallpox has been beyond the immediate response experience of all but the most veteran scientists and government bureaucrats²³ (Bollet, 2004; Feemster, et al., 1932). Those in leadership positions today must not only assess the probability that hostile forces have and are willing to use the smallpox virus, but also whether scientists working in hostile countries have developed a variant on the virus that is resistant to currently used vaccines²⁴ (Preston, 2002). Much is at stake, since the calculation must account for the perhaps unnecessary risks associated with large-scale vaccination prior to an outbreak, the requirement to create a system of organizations to devise and implement a plan that will successfully administer vaccine to the population, and all this in the face of no confirmed stock of terrorist-held smallpox (Institute of Medicine, 2003). There is much to be imagined and the meta-leader must be able to picture it, communicate it to others, and persuade them to act upon what is presumed (Henderson, et al., 1999; Bicknell & James, 2003; Blendon, et al., 2003).

“Those in leadership positions today must not only assess the probability that hostile forces have and are willing to use the smallpox virus, but also whether scientists working in hostile countries have developed a variant on the virus that is resistant to currently used vaccines.”

This work demands fresh insight about points of vulnerability, ways by which terrorists could exploit system weaknesses, potential consequences, strategies to prevent those breaches, and if they cannot be stopped, a procedure already in place to lead the response and recovery (Henderson, Inglesby & O’Toole, 2002; Bozette, et al., 2003). Given the national inexperience with this task, which stretches almost beyond the imagination in the global havoc it could generate, the job requires a deep understanding for how organizations work—their competitive nature—and even more importantly, how they could work together differently (Kizer, 2000).

4. Organizational sensibilities

Organizations each have their own logic and ways of working. Like the pieces of a clock that fit together in form and function, organizations are, in varying degrees, Newtonian systems: there is order, methods for getting things done, and predictable patterns of action and outcome. These are the very attributes associated with organizational effectiveness²⁵ (Handy, 1996).

The job of terrorism preparedness for new and emerging threats requires a different way of acting and reacting. Organizations may have to stretch beyond themselves when forging that seamless web of connectivity necessary to prepare for and respond to unprecedented homeland terrorism.

This objective requires establishment of complex adaptive systems comprised of intentionally linked and interwoven components: practiced, flexible, and ready to spring into out-of-character action on moment’s notice. It is the task of the meta-leader to envision and to construct that network and capacity (Porter-O’Grady & Murdoch, 2003). This means that the existing order may have to be challenged; new methods for getting things done will have to be devised; and that which is predictable and comfortable will have to be revised.

While organizations have embedded lines of communication within their boundaries, the development of complex adaptive systems requires fluid lines of interchange across organizations²⁶ (Dooley, 2005, unpublished). At times, enhanced communication and decision-making is as simple as assembling a new telephone directory, purchasing new compatible equipment, or developing new memorandums of understanding. The real work of developing critical decision-making connectivity, however, is far more complex.

Because a major catastrophe cannot be managed by one entity or jurisdiction in isolation, strategic planning and response requires organizations to assume new tasks and responsibilities, to surrender others, and to create an operational inter-dependence that often contradicts instinctive desires for organizational autonomy and independence. Newtonian thinking contributes critical elements to the response profile: the established incident command systems, plans, protocols, lines of communication, and emergency response infrastructure are all essential. However, in the heat of the moment, for an event that is unprecedented in scope and impact, rigid actions and outcomes alone will not be enough.

The meta-leader is not only able to gain the credibility to make the case for this new brand of connectivity. He or she knows the system well enough, with what could be called “organizational intelligence,” to strategically align different system components in order to make them effectively work for the shared purposes of terrorism preparedness. The meta-leader is able to envision what needs to be done, and is able, referencing purpose and mission, to get people and organizations—building on each of their unique strengths, capabilities, and capacities—to sign on to a new ground-breaking, cross-organizational compatibility.

5. Persuasion

To an often skeptical audience, the terrorism preparedness responsibility requires the meta-leader to make the case for seriously accepting the terrorist threat and then promoting a sound strategy and plan to address it. To be sure, this country has an enviable wealth of experience and sophisticated systems for responding to naturally occurring and accidental mass casualty events: hurricanes, tornados, fires, industrial incidents, and earthquakes. Terrorism, however, is fundamentally different from these catastrophes, since the socio-political stakes are higher and the capabilities to predict, prevent, and control the event are far lower. There are many points of divergence: the surprise and horrifying dimensions of the disaster; the fears and panic it prompts; the direct implications for the area hit and those beyond; and the possibility that there may be immediate repeat terrorist hits (Danzig, 2003). During the pre-event phase of preparedness, the meta-leader must be able to understand and communicate these differences. It is easier to prepare for the known and practiced than for the deeply feared, unprecedented, and unthinkable harm that a large-scale terrorist hit would inflict.

The problem is one of maintaining appropriate readiness in the face of what Max Bazerman terms a “predictable surprise” (Bazerman & Watkins, 2004). A predictable surprise is an event that has a high likelihood of occurring, though it is unknown when, where, or under what exact circumstances. This is at the heart of the unique persuasion problem facing the terrorism preparedness meta-leader. It requires developing a strong case for using and adapting existing capacities and developing new ones to meet the predictable surprise of terrorism. It is likely that terrorist organizations are cognizant of the problem of arguing for high-level vigilance in the absence of homeland terrorism. Had there been a string of small incidents, such as shopping mall bombings, it would be relatively easy to sell terrorism preparedness. That not being the case, it is the task of the meta-leader to effectively persuade the country that getting lax under these circumstances plays into the terrorist strategy, and is in and of itself a danger.

6. Conflict management

On the road to forging a seamless web of connectivity, the preparedness leader is likely to encounter substantial conflict. The events of 9/11 revealed the presence of conflict among agencies that until then were able to occupy distinct and for the most part non-interacting silos. In the process of establishing the Department of Homeland Security, numerous procedural, operational, and cultural differences surfaced when very different silos were assembled to forge a common mission and management strategy. Those differences were exasperated by the imperative to quickly coordinate efforts in the face of what was perceived as an immediate terrorist threat. Large sums of new money and ambitious reorganization activities suddenly were thrust upon a system accustomed to modest budgets and evolutionary change. For example, transitioning a federal funding agency overnight from a \$120 million allocation authority to a \$2 billion dollar budget responsibility creates both tremendous new opportunities as well as vicious competition to grab and control the new trove of treasure. Under these circumstances, not all motives are righteous. It is often necessary for the meta-leader to step in to resolve emerging differences and keep everyone on mission and on track.

The meta-leader must be adept at two distinct forms of conflict resolution. There is resolution of differences that are part of the planning, budget allocation, and logistical organizing process (Slaikeu & Hasson, 1998). These conflicts often pertain to jurisdictional authority, finances, and to the relative independence and influence of agencies involved in the process. Under these circumstances, conflict resolution is often more a matter of consensus building. It requires the meta-leader to work with stakeholders to identify common interests, find mutually beneficial solutions, and develop buy-in to move those solutions forward. There is also on the spot dispute resolution, when different agencies in the

moment of a crisis are in contention about the nature of an event and who is in charge. In the ideal, these sorts of disputes were anticipated and command structures and protocols were put in place beforehand to resolve potentially contentious issues. Short of that, the meta-leader must be able to establish authority and accomplish resolution of conflict in the most difficult of emergency circumstances. This sort of on-the-spot conflict resolution is part of the meta-leader's crisis management responsibility.

7. Crisis management

It is said of military planning that once the fighting begins, well thought-out plans must be quickly reshaped. Such will likely be the case when the country experiences its next major terrorist hit. It will be unprecedented, different than anticipated, and unpredictable in its location, scope, and impact. This is not to suggest that planning be abandoned as a futile exercise. Rather, it is to acknowledge that the country will require people to lead into the unknown and the horrific. The dimensions of the disaster likely will overwhelm the capacity of the jurisdiction hit and the agencies immediately responsible. Furthermore, the impact could take with it part of the response system, as was the case in New York on 9/11 when the City's emergency operations center, located in the World Trade Center, went down with the building (Giuliani, 2002). There will be a need for quick thinking and inventive improvisation. Meta-leaders will be required to compile an immediate and comprehensive picture of the disaster, not only as it affects their agency and its work, but also as it requires coordinated effort across agencies and jurisdictions. In the moment of crisis, these leaders will prompt a coordination of effort that will maximize the response system's capacity to reduce mortality and morbidity.

8. Emotional intelligence

The personal capabilities that drive outstanding performance are described by Daniel Goleman as "emotional intelligence" (Goleman, 2004). Emotional intelligence is particularly valuable for meta-leaders who often operate outside the confines of a conventional organizational structure that is itself a source of stability and confidence. Meta-leaders must derive their steadiness, security, and support from within themselves. There are five components of emotional intelligence.

- 1 *Self-awareness* is the ability to recognize and understand moods, emotions, and drives, your own and those of others, and is often manifest in the form of self-confidence, a balanced self-assessment, and self-deprecating sense of humor;
- 2 *Self-regulation* is the ability to control and redirect disruptive impulses and moods and to think before acting, manifest as trustworthiness, integrity, comfort with ambiguity, and openness to change;
- 3 *Motivation* is a passion to work for reasons beyond money or status, and to do so with energy and persistence, as manifest in ambition, optimism, and commitment;
- 4 *Empathy* is the ability to understand and work with the emotional makeup of other people, and is manifest in building and retaining talented workers, cross-cultural sensitivity, and service to others; and
- 5 *Social skill* refers to proficiency in managing relationships and building networks and to finding common ground and building rapport, manifest as an effectiveness in guiding change, persuasiveness, and expertise in leading and directing teams. For the terrorism preparedness and emergency response meta-leader, emotional intelligence confers the capacity for personal discipline and direction when all around may be in chaos.

9. Persistence

Meta-leadership takes enormous time and effort, and many would tire of the rigor required. In most cases, it is outside the scope of one's job description. Success does not necessarily translate into promotion potential, since its fruit often is born outside the confines of a particular career ladder. Recognition is not guaranteed. And the potential for failure abounds. Therefore, despite the clear value that it reaps for the purposes of preparedness, those who assume the mantle of meta-leader must bring ample persistence and perseverance to the process. Persistence of course is easier to maintain if it is in keeping with the flow of surrounding events. Architects of the Home Front Command in Israel persistently pursued development of a complex system that links, into an integrated network of terrorism emergency response, a broad spectrum of military and civilian agencies. That focus was abetted by the constant threat of war and periodic occurrence of terrorist incidents. Impetus for the effort started in 1991 when the poor response to Iraqi Scud missile hits during the first Persian Gulf War prompted officials to call for a radical redesign of their emergency response capacities (Marcus, 2002). The effort prompted an abundance of meta-leadership that bore fruit nine years later when a prolonged intifada inflicted regular terrorist incidents upon the civilian population. The then fully operational system provided rapid responses to a constant barrage of terrorist incidents, and paid off in significantly reduced mortality and morbidity rates among victims.

“Meta-leadership takes enormous time and effort, and many would tire of the rigor required. In most cases, it is outside the scope of one’s job description.”

10. Meta-leadership as a valued effort

Government agencies interact through a variety of formal contractual arrangements and memoranda of understanding. However, these formal linkages cannot predict or account for the range of anticipated as well as random interactions in the lead up to and moment of an actual terrorist incident. Those linkages ultimately must be on the people-to-people level. Those responsible for leading terrorism preparedness efforts have commented often on the barrage of meetings and conferences that sprouted in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. The content of these meetings turned out to be almost less important than the opportunities provided for a wide spectrum of officials to become acquainted with one another across agencies that would not have normally interacted. Those meetings led to development of cross-agency teams and workgroups that became an important reference point for the preparedness effort. They helped participants recognize the importance of working for the good of the overall enterprise and not solely for parochial interests. The pay off was found to occur in the midst of an emergency, during interactions between otherwise unfamiliar local and state officials, or when health and law enforcement officials had to cooperate in response to a bioterrorist threat. The fact that they had met one another, perhaps participated in a joint exercise and stayed in touch through committee work, was a critical factor in the immediacy and success of the response. Meta-leaders understand and value the importance of that social networking and its direct impact upon the effectiveness of their work during an emergency, especially when interagency cooperation and improvisation are at a premium.

META-LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY

Why is meta-leadership important to crafting the national response to the international terrorist threat? How does the thinking on complex adaptive systems fit into the emerging equation? And in what ways could preparedness leaders transform their mindset to become more effective in advancing the national effort?

The events of 9/11 were a traumatic wake-up call for the nation. The day triggered a new sense of national vulnerability. As the tragedies unfolded on television screens, what had been inconceivable was suddenly transformed into the very real. This was an attack on a scale the United States had never before experienced. The government of the greatest global superpower was defenseless to stop the carnage as it unfolded. The impermeable image of America, the one to which so many people in this country firmly clung, suddenly had to be redefined. There emerged a natural tendency to resist the change.

Terrorism preparedness requires people, most importantly government officials responsible for leading the effort, to internalize that change, making it central to their consciousness, their message, and their work. Unfortunately, there has been, even among those vital to leading the effort, a tremendous skepticism about just what the country faces and just what the preparedness effort must accomplish. The array of weapons of mass destruction now available on the international black market²⁷ (Allison, 2004) if deployed could kill and maim millions in a moment²⁸ (Zagorin, 2004). The scenarios used for planning are horrific on an unprecedented scale, assaults that would dwarf the impact of 9/11. Indeed, according to intercepted documents, Al-Qaida has estimated that it will take 4 million casualties in the United States to topple the nation, their stated goal²⁹ (Stogel, 2004). It is difficult to get one's mind around just what that could mean, in human as well as national and international terms. The impact could in fact spark massive devastation and overwhelm the country. Is it any wonder that even terrorism preparedness officials have a hard time conceding the threat and adjusting their work in response?

To be sure, it is natural for people in the United States to feel—and want to feel—insulated and protected within their borders: it is human nature to believe in and covet the security and safety of one's milieu. Furthermore, a world order dominated by an invulnerable United States conforms to reality as many would like it to be.

U.S. prowess first came into serious question during the Viet Nam war. The United States fought the war in a style that had been successful previously, employing straightforward linear-inspired military strategy and tactics. Fighting against an unconventional enemy, U.S. military forces could not adapt and the military contest was lost. The same is true now against insurgents in Iraq. Both of these wars were fought largely on the same principles and premises that guided the military victories of the World Wars. The enemy changed but political and military strategy and operations did not adequately adapt. Why? Leadership did not believe, until too late in the process, that defeat, against a non-conventional enemy, was an option.

The greatest current peril is that leadership will persist in believing that the country with its markets, institutions, and way of life is invulnerable to defeat by terrorist organizations. Meta-leaders recognize that this belief must be challenged. Multiple, simultaneous, mass-casualty terrorist attacks crippling cities that are vital governmental, financial, scientific, and entertainment centers would send the country into a state of shock from which it could very well only partially recover. The economy could crash. As other countries witness a badly crippled United States, the world order could be disrupted. An unprecedented volume of casualties with family ties across the country would assault and devastate national morale. If all this were to happen—and it could—the experience would change the course of national and global history.

Short of sparking national hysteria, is there a pragmatic model which those working on terrorism preparedness could incorporate into their thinking and strategy? Many leaders working on preparedness in this country have since 9/11 turned to Israel and its vast experience coping with terrorism (Merar, 2003). The premise has been in part that the Israelis do a better and more sophisticated job at handling terrorism simply because, as a result of numerous terrorist incidents, they have more practice (Marcus, 2002).

That is certainly an important part though not the whole of the explanation.

The other more important reason for the added Israeli prowess is their belief that the very survival of their country is at stake. It is in part a function of the country's establishment in the immediate aftermath of the holocaust—a systematic six million deaths and more at the hands of a civilized, cultured, and well-organized regime³⁰ (Kellerman, 2000; Kellerman, 2004). It is also a function of geography and history: Israel is surrounded by hostile countries in an unfriendly region; five wars across its borders; two intifadas within its borders; and a constant wave of domestic terrorism incidents. Technically, what the Israelis do to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist incidents is impressive. But more importantly, they take the threat with dreadful seriousness, and that theme resounds among their preparedness leadership and throughout their response system. Israelis believe that preparedness is a matter of survival and they act accordingly.

Only when terrorism preparedness officials in this country, on all levels of government, including local and state, arrive at the belief that the very survival of the country, as we know it, is at stake will we be able to achieve a level of true preparedness that is matched to the real threat. Based on anecdotal evidence gleaned from conversations and meetings across the country with preparedness officials, this notion of national vulnerability is still foreign to the way most think, and even more importantly, to the way most act³¹ (Bardwick, 1996, 132).

The lesson from these observations is that as a country, we are vulnerable if we believe that we are invulnerable. What is the role for meta-leadership in this equation?

Meta-leaders are able to grasp, communicate, and act upon the intangible vulnerability that faces the country. The meta-leader is able to translate that understanding into a message that motivates others. Meta-leaders recognize that mass casualty terrorism is unpredictable, catastrophic, and overwhelming to the systems designed to cope with its aftermath. They can anticipate the chaos, imagine how they and the system would act under stress, and plan and act accordingly in the current preparedness phase. It is a powerful passion and purpose that engages people and agencies to do what they might not otherwise be inclined to accomplish—to create a strategy and system that will protect the country if it is ever hit by a weapon of mass destruction in a terrorist assault.

Meta-leaders see this pre-event phase as an opportunity to do in advance what will likely be infeasible in the aftermath of a cataclysmic disaster. They understand that aspiring toward and building a complex adaptive system of inter-connected agencies will greatly optimize the effectiveness and success of the after-incident response. They recognize that government credibility in that moment, as well as the country's hope for withstanding such an assault, depends greatly on what occurs in the preparedness period. If we were to prepare in this country as if terrorism could ultimately defeat us, we would have, in the moment of an attack, a higher probability of minimizing death, property loss, and most importantly, the American way of life. This is what is really at stake.

How does this mindset fit into the model of system-based leadership introduced here? Meta-leaders with terrorism-preparedness responsibilities are not only able to effectively span organizations and weave

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important connections amongst them, but just as importantly, meta-leaders are also able to incorporate this tone of critical thinking and perspective and deepen the understanding and work of national preparedness. They have the courage, curiosity, and imagination to explore the scope of what could befall the country. They contribute their organizational sensibilities, power of persuasion, conflict and crisis management to generate traction for their thinking. And as leaders, they have the emotional intelligence, persistence, and belief in their purpose as meta-leaders to craft strategy and actions appropriate to what faces the country.

QUESTIONS REGARDING THE PRACTICE, UNDERSTANDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF META-LEADERSHIP

Meta-leadership is a newly identified practice and a freshly introduced concept, applied to the complexities of the country's inexperienced response to international terrorism. As such, we have found it fraught with the expected problems and questions along with measures of curiosity and enthusiasm. To this point, observations and comments on its utility and value are based solely upon anecdotal evidence. The response from practitioners of leadership focuses upon what is different and difficult about meta-leadership. Those who study leadership question the need for new nomenclature. Those accountable for structuring the response to terrorism wonder how this discrete designation might serve to encourage the sort of coalescing of agencies that is now so critical.

We have heard from practitioners—those in government leadership positions responsible for encouraging and guiding cross-agency collaboration—that there is an important advantage in distinguishing the unique qualities of meta-leadership. Responses have clustered along two themes: the strategic benefits of understanding its significant practice components and the complexities attached to actually striving toward meta-leadership.

These leaders point to entrenched organizational homeostasis. Despite the wake-up call that was 9/11, there remains a firm stubbornness among government agencies to do what has always been done, though now of course with a much more abundant budget. Distinguishing the specific slant and skills of meta-leadership could serve to aid organizational change, in particular on matters of cross-agency collaboration³² (Bennis, 1991).

Meta-leaders believe passionately in what they are doing and its importance for national preparedness. They are perplexed that others don't get it, and hope to encourage a better understanding of the unique contributions and specific challenges of meta-leadership. To be sure, work on terrorism prevention, preparedness, and response is in some measure personally and organizationally disconcerting. In part, this is a function of having to cope with the dreadful threats facing the country. And in part, it is a manifestation of the difficult challenges in pulling together numerous agencies in the effort to build a unified strategic response system. The meta-leadership framework provides a logic and rationale to address and overcome some of the practice challenges and obstacles.

As was alluded to earlier in this paper, an important barrier to meta-leadership practice lies in its cost: meta-leaders are not rewarded or encouraged to work across agency lines. It is often not in the job description, is not career enhancing, takes extra effort and time, and could very well be a distraction from what is in one's best professional interest. There are numerous ways to fail and success can be elusive. And of course, until an actual terrorist event occurs, it may never be known whether the extra effort really paid off. For practitioners, simply identifying the phenomenon of meta-leadership provides it a measure of appreciated legitimacy.

Academics have raised different concerns about singling out and uniquely characterizing cross-boundary organizational leadership. In the minds of some, leadership is leadership and there is no need to devise new names to describe its distinctions. It is argued in this paper that the distinctions identified here are significant and that, as any scientific process that parses out differences and commonalities, they advance analysis, understanding, and practice dynamics. While it is true that a bear is a bear, knowing the distinctions between the grizzly and the polar is scientifically important. Similarly, understanding the differences and distinct challenges and strategies of leadership under divergent circumstances serves to enhance the understanding of leadership, its uses, and its impact.

Those responsible for driving the national learning curve on emergency preparedness face a number of critical questions. How can the new and unsettling leadership challenges facing federal, state, and local emergency preparedness agencies be better understood? What is the role and importance of leadership in raising the country to a higher level of terrorism preparedness? What can be done to cultivate a cadre of newly prepared leaders to meet these new challenges?

In part, these questions raise an important set of research issues at the intersection of inter-organizational relations and leadership studies. Set in the context of the turbulent conditions imposed by the still-fresh threat of international terrorism, there is now a rich laboratory for such inquiry. Emergency preparedness organizations currently operate both in crisis response mode, spurred by immediate concerns regarding a potential terrorist attack, as well as in a business-as-usual mode, following with strict conformity the well-established all-hazards routines and protocols used by emergency response personnel. It is this very tension that offers fertile ground for understanding the different strategies and methods used by leaders under stressful and changing conditions.

There is also now good cause for developing hands-on researcher/practitioner partnerships, specifically between practice-oriented investigators and leading homeland security officials willing to share their emergency preparedness experiences and observations. Much of what is happening or will happen on matters of emergency preparedness and terrorist response occurs in the moment, and there is a great deal to be learned by engaging the investigative process in real time and with people who are in the moment grappling with critical decisions and leadership dilemmas. This new research and understanding most importantly is not to be filed and shelved. It must be quickly disseminated in forms immediately available to practitioners in the field, to include establishment of customized leadership development training programs highlighting the unique emergency-preparedness leadership orientation and specific skills now necessary, as well as through seminars and conferences which themselves can serve to further understanding and practice.

Finally, for all involved, the topic of terrorism preparedness and emergency response is not simply a curiosity of momentary government attention or academic research interest. The country faces a real and overwhelming threat. Should we in the near future experience a mass-casualty terrorist attack, the current leadership development and investigatory work will reap immediate value and will be of continued significance as the nation responds, recovers, rebuilds, and changes as a result of new and potentially traumatic post-event realities. The process proposed here—learning and teaching directed toward even better leading—should continue through the crisis. We know that during harrowing and historic times, leadership matters, and that great leadership can make a real difference. What will be learned then from those leaders, their accomplishments as well as their frustrations, will yield even better refined ideas and practices of significance to national rebuilding into the future.

CONCLUSION: FURTHERING THE STUDY, PRACTICE AND IMPACT OF META-LEADERSHIP

To effectively counter the terrorist challenge, it is necessary to “think like a terrorist” (Ashkenazi, personal communication, October, 2002). This mindset requires a deep appreciation for the motives, means, and objectives of international terrorist organizations. It demands a blunt acknowledgement of national points of vulnerability and ways by which the behavior of government agencies and their leadership contribute—albeit most unintentionally—to that vulnerability. This recognition must then fuel efforts to effectively drive the national learning curve and the changes necessary to accomplish a suitable degree of preparedness.

“The tendency for individual bureaucracies and their leaders to promote silo-based objectives and entrepreneurial interests above their mutual responsibilities for preparedness must be overcome.”

The terrorist challenge demands that we think, act, and plan differently than before. That government agencies tussle over matters of control, authority, and jurisdiction is not news. It is endemic to the character of government work: people strive to advance careers and jostle over budgets as they attend to their day-to-day responsibilities. Personality conflict sometimes obstructs agency mission. Though this is often business as usual, as a country we must make national preparedness a high-enough matter of personal and national priority to get above this fray. Government can do better and can be better. Those responsible for leadership have a responsibility to make it better.

Once one “thinks like a terrorist,” a disquieting realization about terrorism comes better into focus. Terrorism is one manifestation of the primal control struggle now facing the global community.

International terrorist organizations resent the power, authority, and values of Western society, and they seek to disrupt if not completely destroy it. How does this control struggle play out? In the face of weapon-of-mass-destruction terrorism, the conventional devices of international order, diplomacy, weaponry, and trade agreements, are rendered feeble in their inability to quell spiraling chaos. The credible threat of a terrorist attack or even a hoax can curtail air travel, cancel public events, and put officials into a state of high alert. Terrorists win at the control game by changing its mechanics and its rules.

The effort to effectively mobilize public agencies and private organizations toward an appropriate level of preparedness is one manifestation of our national effort to gain and regain some semblance of the control once enjoyed. The identification and development in this country of new leaders, their cultivation, and the evolution of new models for leadership together embody one part of the strategy to change what can be changed.

What could motivate this change? In the face of danger, it is human nature to coalesce. People, in the midst of a threat or catastrophe, do what they might not otherwise even contemplate. That reaction, though, is often fleeting and only in response to a specific event. Individuals and organizations are quick to return to their isolated business as usual. For the vast majority of people in this country, moving back to normal and beyond the devastation and shock of 9/11 has been a positive and healthy process. It is testament to the resilience of the nation that the impact was temporary and recovery was swift.

However, for government and private industry leadership responsible for preventing a recurrence and preparing for its potential consequences, the normal to which they return post-9/11 must be very different from what was before. There needs to be a “new normal”: an energized connectivity along with a fresh

vigilance and readiness among and between public agencies and private organizations that are part of the terrorist response network. The tendency for individual bureaucracies and their leaders to promote silo-based objectives and entrepreneurial interests above their mutual responsibilities for preparedness must be overcome. There too needs to be a new connectivity internationally among countries whose combined efforts have the best chance of mitigating the terrorist threat.

Eventually, these changes and their generated impact will be institutionalized into effective systems and organizations that will routinely achieve a level of surveillance and preparedness appropriate to the risk posed by international terrorism. In the meantime, there is a need for leaders to craft a new brand of cross-organizational linkage that itself serves as an important shield and source of security. Meta-leaders have much to offer this process, and their work and contributions are worthy now of recognition and encouragement, combined with further investigation and understanding.

ENDNOTES

- 1 The report calls for a “different way of organizing government,” to including a new “unity of effort” across the foreign-domestic divide, in the intelligence community, in the sharing of information, in Congress, and in organizing defenses.
- 2 “[T]he Department of Homeland Security remains hampered by personality conflicts, bureaucratic bottlenecks and an atmosphere of demoralization, undermining its ability to protect the nation against terrorist attack, according to current and former administration officials and independent experts.”
- 3 “The Police and Fire Departments barely spoke on 9/11. They set up separate command posts. The firefighters stayed on the ground, 900 feet below fires that the police in helicopters were seeing up close. The two departments had not practiced helicopter operations for at least a year before the attack.... [T]he police in the sky were urging that everyone pull back from the tower, saying that a collapse appeared inevitable. This message was sent over police radios, but went unheard by firefighters. As many as 100 of them were resting on the 19th floor of the north tower. “A wall of firemen, shooting the breeze, as if we were in a park,” said Deputy Chief Joseph Baccellieri, the commanding officer of the New York State Court Officers Association.”
- 4 “[T]hey (New York Fire Department) had no access to ... reports from an NYPD helicopter that was hovering above the towers.”
- 5 “[T]he National Incident Management System integrates effective practices in emergency preparedness and response into a comprehensive national framework for incident management. The NIMS will enable responders at all levels to work together more effectively and efficiently to manage domestic incidents no matter what the cause, size, complexity, including catastrophic acts of terrorism and disasters.” (<http://www.fema.gov/nims>, ¶11)
- 6 “Connections between public health agencies and medicine need to be greatly strengthened—an issue that can also be called *improved connectivity*.” (http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/041802inglesby.htm, ¶10, retrieved March 3, 2005)
- 7 “The TOPOFF exercise illuminated problematic issues of leadership and decision-making; the difficulties of prioritization and distribution of scarce resources; the crisis that contagious epidemics would cause in health care facilities; and the critical need to formulate sound principles of disease containment.”
- 8 Gardner discusses how the sheer size of an organization can create grave problems for the leader interested in vitality, creativity, and renewal.

- 9 The intention here is not to characterize leadership as “bad” and meta-leadership as “good.” The intent is to make the point that each contributes importantly to preparedness efforts. However, needed now is leadership that will advance system connectivity, an objective best accomplished through meta-leadership, a form of leadership of which there is now a paucity. The theme here is to focus attention on what is important and unique about meta-leadership in order to better understand its distinct features and practice elements.
- 10 In keeping with the previous endnote, each individual investigation that is included in a meta-research overview of the literature, just as each piece of information that is incorporated into a meta-analysis review of a critical question, is important. The meta-research and the meta-analysis add another dimension of understanding, just as the meta-leader adds another dimension of direction, action, and impact for achieving cross-organizational purposes.
- 11 “The great challenge facing the nation in further developing its domestic preparedness program is not only to achieve coordination of effort and function within levels of government, but also to make the intergovernmental relationships work effectively.”
- 12 “In fact, many people daily go beyond both their job description and the informal expectations they carry within their organization and do what they are not authorized to do....In the early hours of a disaster, some people will step forward and mobilize others to face and respond to the crisis.” (Heifetz, 1994, 185).
- 13 The authors define a “boundary-less organization” as having “the ability to quickly, proactively, and creatively adjust to changes in the environment.”
- 14 “The mission of the Center for Disease Control’s (CDC) National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS) Program is to ensure the availability and rapid deployment of life-saving pharmaceuticals, antidotes, other medical supplies, and equipment necessary to counter the effects of nerve agents, biological pathogens, and chemical agents. The NPS Program stands ready for immediate deployment to any U.S. location in the event of a terrorist attack using a biological toxin or chemical agent directed against a civilian population.” (<http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=15&content=327>)
- 15 The concept of “connectivity” applied to civilian agencies involved with terrorism preparedness could be likened to the “jointness” adopted by the military during World War II, and embodied in the Joint Chiefs of Staff which coordinates actions of the military branches within the Department of Defense. For background on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see U.S. Department of Defense Official Web Site, Joint Chiefs of Staff page, (<http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/>).
- 16 “Culture is the result of a complex group learning process that is only partially influenced by leader behavior. But if the group’s survival is threatened because elements of its culture have become maladapted, it is ultimately the function of leadership at all levels of the organization to recognize and do something about the situation.”
- 17 “The philosophical obstacle that DOD supports state and local requirements only in an extremis situation was viewed as a major concern. There is currently a perception that the DOD has recast itself as the *Department of Foreign Wars*. The recent declaration that DHS and NORTHCOM will have ‘no formal [direct] relationship’ has state and local governments wondering about their relationship to military support. NORTHCOM, rather than being restricted, needs to encouraged—indeed required—to develop a Theater Engagement Plan with state and local governments.”
- 18 Kritek notes that often, the dominant group feels they speak a universal language when in fact, each group speaks a separate language.
- 19 “Leaders are by definition innovators. They do things other people haven’t done or don’t do. They do things in advance of other people. They make new things. They make old things new. Having learned from the past, they live in the present, with one eye on the future. And each leader puts it all together in a different way. To do that ...leaders must be right-brain, as well as left-brain, thinkers. They must be intuitive, conceptual, synthesizing, and artistic.”
- 20 “When an event is designated a National Special Security Event, the Secret Service assumes its mandated role as the lead agency for the design and implementation of the operational security plan. The Secret Service has developed a core

strategy, the concept of forming partnerships with law enforcement and other security and public safety officials. The goal of the cooperating federal, state and local agencies is to provide a safe and secure environment for our protectees, other dignitaries, the event participants, and the general public.” (<http://www.secretservice.gov/nsse.shtml>, ¶13-5)

- 21 This speaks to the innovation and adaptability seen in Daniel Goleman’s description of emotional intelligence.
- 22 Conversation with homeland security official in Kern County, Bakersfield, California, May 20, 2003.
- 23 The last known spontaneous case of smallpox occurred in Somalia in 1978.
- 24 Richard Preston contends that it is almost certain that illegal stocks of the smallpox virus are in the possession of hostile states, with the possibility that scientists in secret laboratories are using genetic engineering to create a new superpox virus that is resistant to vaccines.
- 25 Charles Handy claims that many organizations are run like very efficient machines which can be designed, measured, and controlled—managed, in other words.
- 26 “A CAS [complex adaptive system] behaves/evolves according to three key principles: order is emergent as opposed to pre-determined, the system’s history is irreversible, and the system’s future is often unpredictable. The basic building blocks of the CAS are agents. Agents are semi-autonomous units that seek to maximize some measure of goodness, or fitness, by evolving over time. Agents scan their environment and develop schema representing interpretive and action rules. These schema are often evolved from smaller, more basic schema.”
- 27 “Pakistan’s black marketers, led by the country’s leading nuclear scientist, A. Q. Khan, have sold comprehensive ‘nuclear starter kits’ that included advanced centrifuge components, blueprints for nuclear warheads, uranium samples in quantities sufficient to make a small bomb, and even provided personal consulting services to assist nuclear development.”
- 28 “A key al-Qaeda operative seized in Pakistan recently offered an alarming account of the group’s potential plans to target the U.S. with weapons of mass destruction, senior U.S. security officials tell *TIME*. Sharif al-Masri, an Egyptian who was captured in late August near Pakistan’s border with Iran and Afghanistan, has told his interrogators of ‘al-Qaeda’s interest in moving nuclear materials from Europe to either the U.S. or Mexico,’ according to a report circulating among U.S. government officials. Masri also said al-Qaeda has considered plans to ‘smuggle nuclear materials to Mexico, then operatives would carry material into the U.S.’ according to the report, parts of which were read to *Time*.”
- 29 “[T]he most likely means of attack would come in the form of a ‘suitcase [size] tactical nuclear bomb.’ Such bombs are estimated to have an explosive strength of approximately ‘10 kilotons’ and could weigh less than 35 pounds.... A bomb of that strength could easily level Manhattan and spread lethal radiation throughout the New York City metro area....According to Williams, several of the ‘suitcase nukes’ are already inside the U.S. Some could have been smuggled in overland from Canada or Mexico, or shipped from overseas via container ships, he explained.”
- 30 It is intriguing to consider that genocide and weapon of mass destruction terrorism is a function of leadership as well. See Barbara Kellerman. “Hitler’s Ghost: A Manifesto.” In Barbara Kellerman & Lorraine Matusak (Eds.), *Cutting edge leadership 2000*. College Park, MD: Center for the Advanced Study of Leadership, 65-68. See also Barbara Kellerman. 2004. *Bad leadership: What it is, how it happens, why it matters*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- 31 “Peacetime has neither crisis nor chaos, so no major change is needed. Instead, people are content with what already exists and change involves a gentle tweaking of an existing system in order to slowly improve it. Peacetime management consists of incremental modification of what already exists, without major disruption and, therefore, without any major emotional consequences.”
- 32 Bennis states “Routine work drives out non-routine work and smothers to death all creative planning, all fundamental change ... in any institution.”

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